Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series

Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference
Papers

2015

Common Law Property Theory and Jurisprudence
in Canada
Sarah E. Hamill

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Recommended Citation
Hamill, Sarah E., "Common Law Property Theory and Jurisprudence in Canada" (2015). Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series.
104.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/104

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 28
Vol. 11/ Issue. 06/ (2015)

Common Law Property Theory and Jurisprudence in Canada
Queen's Law Journal, Vol. 40(2), 2015.
Sarah E. Hamill
Abstract:
In recent years, property theorists have offered varying accounts as to what exactly
ownership is, typically focusing on one or more key rights to the owned thing. However,
most of these theories are articulated in the abstract and do not engage the jurisprudence.
This article uses the jurisprudence concerning expropriation and adverse possession to
show that Canadian courts have in fact developed their own definition of ownership — one
that is not reflected in the property theory discourse. The author goes on to argue that this
narrower definition of ownership — made up by the rights to exclude and to primary use
— is preferable to those offered by the property theorists, as it better balances the
competing interests of owners, non-owners and the state.
Keywords:
Property Law, Property Theory, Canada
Author(s):
Sarah E. Hamill
Osgoode Hall Law School
E: shamill@osgoode.yorku.ca

Common Law Property Theory and
Jurisprudence in Canada
Sarah E. Hamill*
In recent years, property theorists have offered varying accounts as to what exactly ownership
is, typically focusing on one or more key rights to the owned thing. However, most of these
theories are articulated in the abstract and do not engage the jurisprudence. This article uses the
jurisprudence concerning expropriation and adverse possession to show that Canadian courts
have in fact developed their own definition of ownership—one that is not reflected in the property
theory discourse. The author goes on to argue that this narrower definition of ownership—made
up by the rights to exclude and to primary use—is preferable to those offered by the property
theorists, as it better balances the competing interests of owners, non-owners and the state.

* Sessional Instructor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta. I would like to thank the
two anonymous peer reviewers and Christopher Essert for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this article.
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Introduction
Property theory has been booming for over two decades.1 The key
tenets of property theory have been debated, and multiple theories—each
offering a different definition of property—have emerged. These attempts
to define what is really at the core of property typically focus on one
or more of the rights that theorists claim are essential to ownership.2
These theories are relatively abstract, with little reference to actual case
law, though some scholars insist that they are trying to develop a theory
of property, or ownership, that fits the law, or that seeks to explain
property as a legal practice.3 Such claims appear to be the exception rather
than the rule, and it is not clear that the turmoil in property theory has
been reflected in the jurisprudence or, more importantly, what theory of
property dominates the jurisprudence.
In this article, I examine recent developments in property theory and
argue that Canadian jurisprudence offers a superior definition of what
property is—the essence of which is the right to exclude others and the
right to existing uses of the property. This alternative definition, I argue,
allows the balancing of the rights of owners, non-owners and the state
in better ways than those offered by mainstream property theory. Part I
focuses on the changing shape of property theory. In particular, I focus on
1. See Hanoch Dagan, Property: Values and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011) at xi; Amnon Lehavi, The Construction of Property: Norms, Institutions,
Challenges (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 2.
2. The question of how well property theory engages with non-ownership is beyond
the scope of this article. With respect to how ownership is defined, Avihay Dorfman
differs from the majority discussed in this article and focuses on the core power of owners,
not rights. This is further examined below. See Avihay Dorfman, “Private Ownership”
(2010) 16:1 Leg Theory 1 at 17.
3. See Christopher Essert, “The Office of Ownership” (2013) 63:3 UTLJ 418 at 450; Lisa
M Austin, “Possession and the Distractions of Philosophy” in James Penner & Henry
Smith, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013) 182 at 184.
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theorists who are concerned with defining what property is rather than
what it should do—those who are more interested in the how of property
than its outcomes.4 These theorists are generally known as essentialists, as
they are attempting to determine what is essential to property. They are
not concerned with justifying why we have property, rather they seek to
explain what property is, and so they rarely engage with whether or not
property interests are legitimate.5
In Part II, I discuss the definition of property offered by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Canadian Pacific Railway v Vancouver (City) (CPR).6
I argue that this definition echoes that seen in earlier cases, and that it
offers an alternative definition to that of property theorists. In particular,
I focus on two types of cases: those about regulatory takings—or de facto
expropriation as it is called in Canada—and those about adverse possession.
My reason for focusing on these types of cases is that both require the
courts to comment on when a property right, particularly ownership, has
been transferred from one person to another or to the state. As such, each
type offers a window into how the courts understand and define property,
particularly ownership of property. Part III examines how the theory and
the jurisprudence fit together. Although there are similarities in how the
courts and the theorists define ownership, the courts’ definition is fairer
and more predictable. Both theorists and courts recognize the importance
of the right to exclude and the right to use, but the courts have only
extended protection to existing uses, while mainstream property theorists
believe owners should have wide discretion over how their property
is used. I conclude by recognizing that although jurisprudence offers a
narrower definition of property, it provides for a better balance between
the competing interests of owners, non-owners and the state.

4. See Jane B Baron, “Rescuing the Bundle of Rights Metaphor in Property Law”
(2014) 82:1 U Cin L Rev 57.
5. That is not to say their work does not implicitly rely on certain kinds of political
arrangements. See Joseph William Singer, “Property as the Law of Democracy” (2014) 63:6
Duke LJ 1287 at 1300.
6. 2006 SCC 5, [2006] 1 SCR 227 [CPR].
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I. Property in Theory: More than Exclusion
While there is significant disagreement over what exactly property is,
it is generally accepted that property law is a way of managing resources.7
As such, property law must contain rules about who can use what
things for what purposes and for how long they may use those things.
The observation that many different rights can exist in a single piece of
property is trite but true; not all property rights will necessarily be united
in the owner. The problem facing property theory is how to capture the
various rights that can exist in property law. Traditionally, the multiple
property rights have been illustrated via the “bundle of rights” theory.
However, there has been increasing dissatisfaction with this theory.8 My
goal is not to offer a complete history of property theory, and so my
discussion in this Part focuses on the essentialist property theorists who
began to write in the 1990s. Some essentialist work occurred before then,
but it was not until the 1990s that the modern backlash against the bundle
of rights theory snowballed.9 This Part begins with a brief overview of the
bundle theory before examining critiques of, and proposed alternatives
to, the theory.

7. See e.g. Thomas W Merrill, “The Property Strategy” (2012) 160:7 U Pa L Rev 2061
at 2062 [Merrill, “Property Strategy”]; Henry E Smith, “On the Economy of Concepts in
Property” (2012) 160:7 U Pa L Rev 2097 at 2104; David Lametti, “The Concept of Property:
Relations Through Objects of Social Wealth” (2003) 53:4 UTLJ 325; Gregory S Alexander,
The Global Debate Over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006) at 5; Yonatan Even, “Appropriability and
Property” (2009) 58:6 Am U L Rev 1417 at 1421.
8. See e.g. Kenneth J Vandevelde, “The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modern Concept of Property” (1980) 29:2 Buff L Rev 325; Baron,
supra note 4 at 58–67; Jeanne L Schroeder, “Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique
of the Disaggregation of Property” (1994) 93:2 Mich L Rev 239.
9. See e.g. JE Penner, “The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture of Property” (1996) 43:3 UCLA
L Rev 711 [Penner, “Bundle of Rights”]; JE Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997) at 1 [Penner, Idea of Property]; Thomas W Merrill, “Property and
the Right to Exclude” (1998) 77:4 Neb L Rev 730 [Merrill, “Right to Exclude”]. This list is
not exhaustive.
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Although there is some disagreement surrounding the origins of the
bundle theory,10 Tony Honoré has offered perhaps the clearest discussion
of it in his essay on ownership.11 Put simply, the bundle theory posits that
there are several rights a person can have in relation to a piece of property,
and that multiple people can have rights—though not necessarily identical
rights—to the same piece of property. The bundle theory implies that
these rights are severable and does not explain how or if these rights relate
to one another. As such, it is relatively skeletal and has been described as
nothing more than “an elaboration of the scope of action that ownership
provides”.12 This description is slightly unfair. The bundle theory was
never meant to be just a discussion on the rights of owners. It was meant
to delineate the various rights that can exist in a single thing—not all of
which may be united in a single rights holder.
The potential for multiple rights holders allowed the bundle theory to
become linked with the idea that property was really about individuals’
relationships with each other rather than being about the right to a
thing. This “dephysicalization” of property is usually attributed to the
work of Hohfeld and the legal realist movement.13 Hohfeld understood
property as a set of legal relations rather than being about things, and
this idea was built upon by subsequent scholars so that any entitlement
could, at least in theory, be considered property.14 The idea that
property is really a relationship has come under sustained attack along
with the bundle theory for failing to grasp the thingness of property,15
10. See Richard A Epstein, “Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist
Conceptions of Private Property” (2011) 8:3 Econ J Watch 223 at 225; Baron, supra note
4 at 60.
11. Tony Honoré, “Ownership” in Tony Honoré, ed, Making Law Bind: Essays Legal and
Philosophical (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 161 at 161−68.
12. Penner, “Bundle of Rights”, supra note 9 at 741.
13. See e.g. Vandevelde, supra note 8 at 329–30, 359–61, referring to Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”
(1913) 23:1 Yale LJ 16; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1917) 26:8 Yale LJ 710.
14. See e.g. CB Macpherson, “Liberal-Democracy and Property” in CB Macpherson,
ed, Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1978) 199.
15. See Vandevelde, supra note 8 at 329; Craig Anthony Arnold, “The Reconstitution of
Property: Property as a Web of Interests” (2006) 26:2 Harv Envtl L Rev 281 at 292; Even,
supra note 7 at 1419.
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threatening to reduce property to mere nominalism16 and its disaggregation
of property.17
James Penner squarely linked the dephysicalization of property with
the bundle of rights theory18 and argued that the bundle theory was not
a theory at all.19 He said that the bundle theory “multiplies elements of
property to produce an explanation which is actually inferior to one
which regards it as a unified legal relation”.20 In other words, it seems to
make every valuable entitlement into property, a tendency that Penner
blamed on economists.21 Other property theorists have also echoed
these arguments—that the bundle theory “is more of a description than a
theory”22 and that economic scholarship has failed to “take property more
seriously”23—as they too seek to offer a better understanding of property.
In response to the failures of the bundle of rights theory, alternative
theories typically look to one core right or try to lump several rights
together. Of all the rights in the bundle, the right to exclude is the one
most often relied upon as being the core, defining right of property—with
property typically meaning ownership.24 Thomas Merrill’s argument that
the right to exclude is the sine qua non of property is perhaps the most
famous articulation of the centrality of this right to property.25 Certainly
it is the most straightforward, with other theorists offering variations on
16. See Adam Mossoff, “What is Property: Putting the Pieces Back Together” (2003) 45:2
Ariz L Rev 371 at 372; Henry E Smith, “Property as the Law of Things” (2012) 125:7 Harv
L Rev 1691 at 1697 [Smith, “Law of Things”]; Thomas W Merrill & Henry E Smith, “What
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?” (2001) 111:2 Yale LJ 357 at 358; Henry
E Smith, “Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American
Property Law” (2008) 94:4 Cornell L Rev 959 at 963 [Smith, “Mind the Gap”].
17. See Schroeder, supra note 8; Mossoff, supra note 16 at 375; Dagan, supra note 1 at 38
(noting the disaggregation critique).
18. Penner, “Bundle of Rights”, supra note 9 at 732−33; Penner, Idea of Property, supra
note 9 at 1−5; Stephen R Munzer, “A Bundle Theorist Holds on to His Collection of
Sticks” (2011) 8:3 Econ J Watch 265 at 266.
19. Penner, “Bundle of Rights”, supra note 9 at 741.
20. Ibid at 739.
21. Penner, Idea of Property, supra note 9 at 64.
22. Smith, “Law of Things”, supra note 16 at 1694.
23. Merrill & Smith, supra note 16 at 358.
24. See e.g. Lehavi, supra note 1 at 2−4.The collapse of property theory into ownership
theory is well known but is beyond the scope of this article to engage with fully.
25. Merrill, “Right to Exclude”, supra note 9 at 730. Penner’s version of right to exclude
predated Merrill. See the text accompanying notes 27–29.

684

(2015) 40:2 Queen’s LJ

the right to exclude rather than Merrill’s right to exclude simipliciter.
Yet perhaps because of its simplicity, Merrill’s formulation of the right
to exclude has several weaknesses. It does not, for example, guarantee any
right of entry into the property, nor does it speak to what the right holder
can do with her property.26
The variations on the right to exclude, including one later offered by
Merrill himself,27 offer ways around the weaknesses of relying simply on
the right to exclude. Penner sought to ground his version of the right to
exclude in the “interest we have in the use of things”—an interest that he
noted was social.28 He argued that:
The right to property is the right to determine the use or disposition of an alienable thing
in so far as that can be achieved or aided by others excluding themselves from it, and
includes the right to abandon it, to share it, to license it to others (either exclusively or not)
and to give it to others in its entirety.29

This unitary, though multi-pronged, right lumps several rights from the
bundle together and emphasizes that dictating use is an important property
right. In fact, there are those who claim that “the law designates an owner
who has a presumptive right to exclude others from determin[ing] the use
of a defined thing”30 and that the right to exclude from the physical thing
flows from this designation.31
The idea that the power to decide is an important property right is
also seen in Larissa Katz’s argument that the right to set the agenda is the
core ownership right.32 The agenda-setting right functions as a variation
of the right to exclude in that the right to set the agenda is exclusive to the
owner. In other words, the owner has the right to exclude others from
making decisions about how the property is used. Katz notes that while the
26. See Richard Epstein, Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public Administration and
the Rule of Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011) at 77 [Epstein, Design
for Liberty].
27. Merrill, “Property Strategy”, supra note 7 at 2065.
28. Penner, “Bundle of Rights”, supra note 9 at 743.
29. Ibid at 742. But see Epstein, Design for Liberty, supra note 26 at 78.
30. Yun-Chien Chang & Henry E Smith, “An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus
Common Law Property” (2012) 88:1 Notre Dame L Rev 1 at 23.
31. Ibid at 24.
32. Larissa Katz, “Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law” (2008) 58:3 UTLJ 275
at 289–90 [Katz, “Exclusion and Exclusivity”].
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owner’s right to set the agenda will not trump the state’s power to make
decisions, it is superior to the rights of other private individuals.33 Katz
has since further developed her theory of ownership with the argument
that the agenda-setting right only allows the owner to use her property in
a way that she feels is worthwhile.34 This limitation is designed to prevent
owners from using their position as a way to dominate others.35 It will
only apply in an “abuse of right” situation, where “[a]n owner exceeds
her jurisdiction” and “her real purpose is . . . to cause harm—not only as
an end in itself but also as a means to gain leverage”.36 This restriction of
the right to use is relatively narrow, and for the most part the right to
use or set the agenda remains broad.37 Katz’s “principle of abuse of right”
attempts to explain when it is legitimate to restrict owners’ power to
dictate uses.
Katz is far from the only theorist to recognize that owners’ powers
are, or should be, constrained. In more recent work, Merrill emphasizes
the restrictions on owners while arguing that property is about deciding
how to use resources.38 The “concept of ownership” continues to
be important in Merrill’s discussion of property, and he argues that
ownership is characterized by two prerogatives: “residual managerial
authority” and “residual accessionary rights”.39 For the former prerogative
he uses “residual” to highlight that the owner’s control will always be
constrained. By the latter he means that the owner will have the right to
changes in value.40 Ownership thus remains powerful, but it exists in a
world of laws that can—and do—limit the owner’s right to set the agenda
for his property.

33. Ibid at 295.
34. Larissa Katz, “Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of (Property)
Right” (2013) 122:6 Yale LJ 1444 at 1448–49 [Katz, “Spite and Extortion”].
35. Ibid at 1451.
36. Ibid at 1455. But see Bradford Corporation v Pickles, [1895] AC 587 (HL).
37. See e.g. Henry E Smith, “Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance”
(2004) 90:4 Va L Rev 965 at 971; Robert C Ellickson & Charles Dia Thorland, “Ancient
Land Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel” (1995) 71:1 Chicago-Kent L Rev 321 at 346; Chang
& Smith, supra note 30 at 33.
38. Merrill, “Property Strategy”, supra note 7 at 2062.
39. Ibid at 2066–67.
40. Ibid at 2068–70.
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The idea that exclusion carries with it more than simply the right
to exclude others is tacit in these glosses on the right to exclude. On
occasion, property theorists have offered a group of core rights. Richard
Epstein, for example, has argued that the rights to exclude, use and
dispose of the property should be considered equal, and should never be
separated from one another.41 The argument thus becomes that property
is lumpy. It is not endlessly scalable or malleable, and the law will only
recognize particular lumps of rights as property.42 This lumpy—or
modular—approach to property allows certain rights to clump together,
while seeking to explain how some of the rights in the bundle theory
interact with each other.43 For Henry Smith, what is important about this
modular approach is that it allows property law to efficiently manage the
complexity of interactions between private parties.44
There is something intuitively correct about Smith’s concept of
modularity in property. In practice, property rights are not as neatly
severable as the bundle theory seems to suggest, and tinkering with one
right will necessarily impact other rights.45 Smith is unwilling to argue
that any particular feature of property is absolute, but he notes that
three basic features ought to be considered central: “the in rem aspect of
property, the right to exclude, and the residual claim”.46 Though these
features do not have to be present in every instance of property, and can
be removed or added to as needed, they are the default package—property
at its most basic.47
Rather than seeking to define property, Simon Douglas and Ben
McFarlane have sought to explain what is distinctive about property
rights. However, in so doing they offer an interesting gloss on the idea of
property as lumpy.48 Douglas and McFarlane have argued that property
41. Epstein, Design for Liberty, supra note 26 at 78.
42. See Lee Anne Fennell, “Lumpy Property” (2012) 160:7 U Pa L Rev 1955 at 1963;
Chang & Smith, supra note 30 at 33; Smith, “Law of Things”, supra note 16 at 1700–02.
43. Smith, “Law of Things”, supra note 16 at 1692, 1699–703, 1709, 1725–26.
44. Ibid at 1699.
45. Ibid at 1716–17.
46. Ibid at 1709.
47. Ibid.
48. Simon Douglas & Ben McFarlane, “Defining Property Rights” in James Penner &
Henry Smith, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014) 219.
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rights are distinguished by the duty of the rest of the world not to interfere
with the owned thing.49 For Douglas and McFarlane, the duty of the rest
of the world not to interfere with owned things makes up the owner’s
right to exclude,50 and as such, the right to exclude is a “claim-right” in the
Hohfeldian sense.51 This understanding still leaves room for open-ended
uses of the property, but crucially, the right to use is not a claim-right,
but a liberty or privilege; the right to use gives the owner freedom to
use his property but does not impose duties on anyone else.52 Use rights
will be indirectly protected by the general duty of non-interference, but
they will not impose duties on others in and of themselves.53 Douglas
and McFarlane have argued that their conception is lumpy insofar as it
organizes a property right around the general duty “not to physically
interfere with a physical thing”.54 Yet their definition seems to undermine
the idea of lumpiness because in arguing that use rights are a different class
of right than the right to exclude, they allow for use rights to be severed,
and as a result, do not guarantee that the owner will be able to access her
property.
Avihay Dorfman has criticized property theorists’ recent emphasis on
the right to exclude and the right to use as the key features of property
because this definition does not differentiate ownership from possession.55
Like Katz, Dorfman’s definition of private ownership focuses on the
“special authority” of owners. Unlike Katz, however, he has argued
that the defining feature of an owner is his power to “change (in some
non-trivial measure) the rights and duties that nonowners have toward
the owner with respect to an object”, rather than the right to set the
agenda for an object.56 As such, Dorfman’s theory does not “predetermine
the breadth and scope of ownership” in the way that many essentialist
theories do.57 He seeks to leave room for argument about what the rights
of ownership might be, but he also seeks to capture the relational aspects
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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Ibid at 240.
Ibid at 222.
Ibid at 221.
Ibid at 223, 226–27.
Ibid at 227–33.
Ibid at 243.
Dorfman, supra note 2 at 2–3.
Ibid at 17, 20–23 (criticizing Katz’s agenda setting theory).
Ibid at 28–31.
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of property.58 That said, Dorfman claims that the power of alienation is
the “manifestation” of an owner’s power because it demonstrates how
an owner can alter the normative standing of others with respect to an
object.59 Here there is an echo of the idea that the right to dispose of one’s
property is a key feature of property.60 Dorfman’s thesis links the loss of
the right to dispose with the loss of an owner’s authority, and thus the
loss of ownership altogether.61 Although there are some clear differences
between the essentialist theories of property outlined in this Part, there
are also many similarities.
Most essentialist theorists would agree that exclusion remains central
to property, but that the right to exclude others does not do enough by
itself. As such, there has been a shift to either a more expansive exclusionary
right—one which carries with it rights of use and so on—or to the idea
that property is lumpy or modular, and certain rights come as a package.
Such claims are a clear response to the belief that the bundle theory made
property endlessly malleable. Crucially, some of these theories are also
beginning to hint at the ways in which one person’s property rights
interact with another’s. Smith argues that adjacent property rights “mesh”
with each other and ultimately form something of a network,62 while Katz
argues that a person can only use their property in worthwhile ways and
not in ways designed to gain leverage over others.63 Dorfman’s argument
about the special authority of owners is the most explicitly relational
account of ownership, though he does not fully flesh out the questions
of legitimacy that surround an owner’s authority.64 Consequently, the
focus of these essentialist theorists remains very much on the what of
property, and particularly on the rights or powers that define ownership.
For the most part, these theories fail to seriously engage with actual
jurisprudence on property, and when they do the evidence is somewhat
limited. This is because these theories tend to be formed with reference
58. Ibid at 32–34.
59. Ibid at 34.
60. Penner, “Bundle of Rights”, supra note 9 at 742; Epstein, Design for Liberty, supra
note 26 at 78.
61. Dorfman, supra note 2 at 34.
62. Smith, “Law of Things”, supra note 16 at 1707.
63. Katz, “Spite and Extortion”, supra note 34 at 1451.
64. Dorfman, supra note 2 at 35.
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to the United States rather than other common law jurisdictions.65
Yet discussions of property in other jurisdictions—Canada in this
instance—can shed light on the theoretical debates surrounding property,
and can even offer an alternative definition.

II. Property in Court: The Importance of the
Primary Use
The term “Canadian property jurisprudence” is something of a
misnomer. Under the Constitution Act, 1867,66 property is a subject
assigned to the provinces, so there is not necessarily uniformity across
the country.67 This lack of uniformity is obvious in the case of Quebec,
where a civil law system of property is used instead of the common law
system employed in the other provinces.68 As my title suggests, the focus
in this article is on the common law provinces, but even among these
provinces uniformity is often lacking. Alberta, for example, continues
to allow adverse possession under a Torrens system of land titles while
the other common law provinces do not.69 That being said, my goal is
not so much to argue that there is uniformity between the provinces,
but to argue that the jurisprudence offers an alternative definition of
property—the essence of which is the right to exclude others and the right
to existing uses of the property.
I begin with a discussion of the jurisprudence on de facto expropriation;
in particular, I examine the most recent restatement of this doctrine
by the Supreme Court of Canada. Then I move on to show how the
understanding of property contained within Canadian Pacific Railway v
65. For some exceptions, see e.g. Larissa Katz, “A Traditionalist’s Property Jurisprudence”
in Kim Brooks, ed, Justice Bertha Wilson: One Woman’s Difference (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2009) 39 [Katz, “A Traditionalist’s Property Jurisprudence”]; Mary Jane Mossman,
“Toward ‘New Property’ and ‘New Scholarship’: An Assessment of Canadian Property
Scholarship” (1985) 23:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 633 at 634; Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 48.
66. (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5.
67. See Mossman, supra note 65 at 634.
68. There are of course some attempts to read the civil law and common law jurisprudence
together. See e.g. Michael H Lubetsky, “Adding Epicycles: The Inconsistent Use Test in
Adverse Possession Law” (2009) 47:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 497.
69. See Sandra Petersson, “Something for Nothing: The Law of Adverse Possession in
Alberta” (1992) 30:4 Alta L Rev 1291 at 1296.
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Vancouver (City) is compatible with the existing jurisprudence on this
topic, as well as with the jurisprudence on adverse possession. Central
to Canadian courts’ understanding of property is how that property
is primarily or historically used. The courts do not protect speculative
future uses, suggesting that in Canada the right to use is much narrower
than allowed for by property theorists.
The facts of CPR are relatively simple and are centred on whether
or not the City of Vancouver had expropriated a section of disused
railway track known as the Arbutus Corridor. The Corridor “winds ten
kilometres north-south through the west side of the City of Vancouver.
Owned in fee simple by the CPR, this fifty to sixty-six foot-wide strip of
land is, depending on one’s perspective, forty-five acres of enormously
valuable real estate, or a precious ribbon of automobile-free urban land.”70
In light of the unprofitability of continuing to use the Corridor for train
service, the Canadian Pacific Railway (CP Rail) proposed to develop it
“for residential and commercial purposes”71 and invited Vancouver to
expropriate the Corridor.72 Vancouver declined to do so; instead, the city
adopted the Arbutus Corridor Official Development Plan By-law,73 which
“designated the corridor as a public thoroughfare for transportation and
‘greenways’, like heritage walks, nature trails and cyclist paths”.74 The
bylaw also explicitly protected the Corridor’s prior use as a railway by
listing rail as an approved use.75 Understandably, CP Rail objected to
this plan and alleged that it was “a de facto taking of its land, requiring
compensation”.76
In deciding whether or not CP Rail had suffered a de facto taking,
the Supreme Court necessarily offered insight into how it understands
70. Douglas C Harris, “A Railway, a City, and the Public Regulation of Private Property:
CPR v City of Vancouver” in Eric Tucker, James Muir & Bruce Ziff, eds, Property on Trial:
Canadian Cases in Context (Toronto: Irwin Law for the Osgoode Society for Canadian
Legal History, 2012) 455 at 455.
71. Ibid; CPR, supra note 6 at paras 2–3.
72. CPR, supra note 6 at paras 3–4.
73. City of Vancouver, by-law No 8249, A By-law to Adopt the Arbutus Corridor
Development Plan as an Official Development Plan (25 July 2000); CPR, supra note 6 at
paras 5–8.
74. CPR, supra note 6 at para 4.
75. Ibid at para 7.
76. Ibid at para 28.
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property. The Canadian test for de facto takings is strict and requires
that there is “(1) an acquisition of a beneficial interest in the property or
flowing from it, and (2) removal of all reasonable uses of the property”.77
The Court found that the bylaw did not meet the first part of the test
because all Vancouver got from the bylaw was “some assurance that the
land will be used or developed in accordance with its vision, without even
precluding the historical or current use of the land”.78 This reasoning also
points to why the Court thought that CP Rail had not lost “all reasonable
uses” of the Corridor. In fact, the Court went on to state that CP Rail
could still exclude people from the Arbutus Corridor, and that those
Vancouverites currently biking or walking along the Corridor were
committing trespass.79 As the Court put it, “the by-law does not remove
all reasonable uses of the property . . . [it] does not prevent CPR from
using its land to operate a railway, the only use to which the land has ever
been put during the history of the City”.80 Thus the important property
rights—according to the Court—are the right to exclude and the right to
the primary or historical use of the property.
Notably, the Court seems to discount the idea that the right to set the
agenda is essential to ownership, or even a property right at all.81 Many
property theorists believe that the right to set the agenda is a key right—if
not the key right—of ownership.82 Granted, Katz argues that the owner
is only “supreme vis-a-vis other private individuals” and not in regards to
77. Ibid at para 30. Indeed, there are those who criticize this test for being more
appropriate for de jure expropriation. See e.g. Russell Brown, “Legal Incoherence and the
Extra-Constitutional Law of Regulatory Takings: The Canadian Experience” (2009) 1:3 Int
JL in Built Environment 179 at 188–89 [Brown, “Legal Incoherence”].
78. CPR, supra note 6 at para 33. For a critique of this decision, see Russell Brown, “The
Constructive Taking at the Supreme Court of Canada: Once More, Without Feeling”
(2007) 40:1 UBC L Rev 315 [Brown, “Once More”]; Brown, “Legal Incoherence”, supra
note 77.
79. CPR, supra note 6 at para 33.
80. Ibid at paras 33–34.
81. Ibid (“[t]he City has gained nothing more than some assurance that the land will be
used or developed in accordance with its vision, without even precluding the historical or
current use of the land. This is not the sort of benefit that can be construed as a ‘tak[ing]’”).
82. See Katz, “Exclusion and Exclusivity”, supra note 32 at 284; Jeremy Waldron, “What
is Private Property?” (1985) 5:3 Oxford J Leg Stud 313 at 333; Merrill, “Property Strategy”,
supra note 7 at 2067−70. See also Penner, “Bundle of Rights”, supra note 9; Penner, Idea of
Property, supra note 9.
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the state.83 As such, her formulation leaves room for the state to dictate
uses of property, but CPR’s limitation is much stricter than that typically
envisaged by property theory. The Court even noted that the Vancouver
Charter precluded the possibility of describing “property affected by a
by-law” as having been taken,84 which leaves owners without a remedy.
Such emphasis on existing or historical uses implies that owners have a
relatively constrained right to decide how their property is used. It is
not clear whether CPR would have been decided differently had the
bylaw prohibited the historical uses of the Corridor, but CPR is not the
only case where the Court has deferred to existing uses. In fact, such
deference is common among other cases involving de facto expropriation,
or regulatory takings.
The Canadian doctrine of regulatory takings is not only much
younger than that seen in the United States, but it is also much smaller
and stricter.85 The Canadian doctrine of de facto takings requires both a
loss by the property owner and a gain by the government. As a result,
there are only a handful of cases where the courts have actually found that
there was a de facto expropriation of property.86 Importantly, these cases
did not involve fee simple ownership in land as CPR did, but involved
rights such as goodwill87 or the ownership of mineral claims.88 These rights
are all better described as use rights, which are more vulnerable to being
rendered useless by government regulation than fee simple ownership.
Using the mineral claims cases as an example, if government regulation
prohibits the removal of minerals, there is no other use that the ownership
of such claims can be put to.89 Consequently, any prohibition on removal
amounts to a total loss of the right, which requires compensation.
83. Katz, “Exclusion and Exclusivity”, supra note 32 at 295.
84. CPR, supra note 6 at para 36, discussing Vancouver Charter, SBC 1953, c 55, s 569.
85. See Stephen R Munzer, A Theory of Property (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1990) at 447 (the American takings case law is often unpredictable).
86. See Manitoba Fisheries Ltd v R (1978), [1979] 1 SCR 101, [1978] 6 WWR 496 [Manitoba
Fisheries cited to SCR]; British Columbia v Tener, [1985] 1 SCR 533, 17 DLR (4th) 1 [Tener
cited to SCR]; Casamiro Resource Corp v British Columbia (1991), 55 BCLR (2d) 346, 80
DLR (4th) 1 (CA) [Casamiro cited to BCLR].
87. See Manitoba Fisheries, supra note 86. For an in-depth discussion of this case, see Jim
Phillips & Jeremy Martin, “Manitoba Fisheries v the Queen: The Origins of Canada’s De
Facto Expropriation Doctrine” in Tucker, Muir & Ziff, supra note 70, 259.
88. See Tener, supra note 86 at 536–38; Casamiro, supra note 86 at 347.
89. For the legislation, see Tener, supra note 86 at 538; Casamiro, supra note 86 at 350.
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The courts’ reasoning is less convincing in these cases when they
explain what exactly the government has gained. In Manitoba Fisheries Ltd
v R, the Court found that the government had acquired the company’s
goodwill based on the fact that “the appellant’s suppliers and customers
who it had acquired and cultivated over the years [and who] constituted
one of its most valuable assets . . . were left with no choice but to do
business with the Freshwater Fish Marketing Corporation”.90 However,
in the two cases dealing with the loss of mineral claims, the government’s
gain was less clear. In British Columbia v Tener, the majority observed that
the British Columbia government had “at minimum acquired a negative
right not to compensate the respondents for future mineral development
by forestalling any such development”.91 The concurring judgment of
Dickson CJC and Wilson J simply referred to the earlier decision of
Manitoba Fisheries to refute the government’s assertion that it had not
acquired the mineral claims.92
In the cases dealing with the loss of goodwill or mineral claims, the
government’s gain is arguably proven by the loss of the property right.
Although both goodwill and mineral claims are apparently severable
from the items to which they are attached—either the physical assets of a
business or the land over which the mineral claims lie—in a factual sense,
the property rights remain dependent on the assets. If the land or the
physical assets to which the severed property right is attached were to be
destroyed or rendered unusable, so too would the goodwill and mineral
claims be destroyed. Consequently, if an owner loses his goodwill or
mineral claim, it must then be considered to have returned to the owner
of the physical asset or the land.
The pre-CPR jurisprudence on regulatory takings makes it clear that
if the owner can continue to use her property as she always has, there
is no loss and consequently no gain. In fact, in Mariner Real Estate v
Nova Scotia (AG), a case which is similar to CPR in that it dealt with
use restrictions on property owned in fee simple, the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal found that because the owners could continue to use their
property as they always had, they had suffered no loss.93 The Court even
90.
91.
92.
93.
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noted that “ownership carries with it the possibility of stringent land use
regulation”.94 The owners in question were not completely precluded
from building on their land; they could still build subject to securing the
necessary permits and showing that their plans respected the fact that their
land was on an environmentally protected beachfront.95 In other words, it
was not clear that the owners had actually lost this potential future use; the
legislation added additional conditions, but did not amount to an outright
ban on building. Nonetheless, the Court focused its analysis on actual
uses, rather than speculative future uses.96 As the loss of a future interest
did not represent the loss of a property right, there was no corresponding
gain by the government, and so no de facto expropriation.
Canadian courts’ focus on current or historical uses of property
as a way of assessing the loss or gain of property is also seen in the
jurisprudence on adverse possession. Adverse possession might pose
something of a moral paradox97 in that it allows a non-owner to usurp
the true owner, but its underlying goal is to promote “the stability and
certainty of landholdings”.98 In theory, the doctrine also seeks to encourage
owners to actually use their property and make it known that they are
owners.99
Of all the provinces that still allow for adverse possession, Ontario’s
jurisprudence has attracted the most academic attention as a result of
its “inconsistent use test”.100 This test appeared in the late 1970s and
modified the old common law requirements of actual possession and
an animus possidendi—an intent to possess and exclude all others101—by
adding the requirement that the adverse possessor’s use be inconsistent
with the owners’ use of the land.102 Katz argues that the appearance of the
94. Ibid at 306, 309.
95. Ibid at 319.
96. Ibid at 301–03.
97. See Larissa Katz, “The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and
Revolution in Property Law” (2010) 55:1 McGill LJ 47 at 49.
98. Lubetsky, supra note 68 at 500.
99. Ibid.
100. See Lubetsky, supra note 68; Katz, “A Traditionalist’s Property Jurisprudence”, supra
note 65; Brian Bucknall, “Two Roads Diverged: Recent Decisions on Possessory Title”
(1984) 22:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 375.
101. See Lubetsky, supra note 68 at 507.
102. Keefer v Arillotta (1976), 13 OR (2d) 680 at 691, 72 DLR (3d) 182 (CA).
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inconsistent use test supports her claim that the agenda-setting right is the
key right of ownership.103 However, given the Supreme Court’s refusal
to recognize this right in CPR, the inconsistent use test could be read as
further evidence of the courts seeking to protect and uphold the current
or historical uses of the property. The Ontario Court of Appeal has
explicitly stated that the inconsistent use test cannot be used to protect
future uses planned by the owner,104 suggesting that only current uses
are relevant. Somewhat paradoxically, however, the Court of Appeal has
also found that holding land for future development can be counted as a
current use.105 Such statements may be evidence of the perceived difficulty
that Ontario courts have with the inconsistent use test,106 but they also
make it significantly harder for adverse possession claims to succeed.
In addition to protecting current uses of the property, the inconsistent
use test also tacitly protects the owner’s right to exclude. It was this idea
of exclusion which animated Katz’s argument about the agenda-setting
right’s relationship with the inconsistent use test because inconsistent
uses necessarily usurp the owner’s position as sole agenda setter for the
property.107 There is a kernel of truth in this argument, but inconsistent
uses also imply that the owner has been excluded from the property in a
simpler sense—namely that the owner has failed to be physically present
or to take any actions to make his presence felt. So long as the disputed
property is being used as the actual owner used it, there is no evidence
that the owner has abandoned his property. As such, the right to exclude
and the right to the historical or current use of the property seem to
reinforce each other in Ontario’s adverse possession jurisprudence.
To succeed in an adverse possession claim in Alberta, a person must
prove exclusive possession of the disputed land.108 Alberta has not yet
adopted the inconsistent use test, but does require that the adverse
possessor possess the land in a way that is “outwardly inconsistent with
103. Katz, “A Traditionalist’s Property Jurisprudence”, supra note 65 at 44–50.
104. Elliott v Woodstock Agricultural Society, 2008 ONCA 648 at para 16, 298 DLR
(4th) 577.
105. Ibid at para 25.
106. See Lubetsky, supra note 68 at 498.
107. Katz, “A Traditionalist’s Property Jurisprudence”, supra note 65 at 44
108. See Andriet v Strathcona No 20 (County of), 2008 ABCA 27 at para 72, [2008] 5
WWR 590.
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the notion of another holding title”.109 Such claims are in keeping with the
historical requirements that adverse possession be open and notorious.110
While Ontario’s inconsistent use test allows the courts to examine the
state of mind of the titleholder,111 Alberta’s jurisprudence on adverse
possession examines the state of mind of the adverse possessor. If the
adverse possessor thinks that he has a right to use the land in question
but does not think he owns the land, any claims for adverse possession
will fail.112
When read with the jurisprudence on regulatory takings, the
jurisprudence on adverse possession suggests many of the same ideas
about property. In both, there is attention given to the right to exclude
and whether or not the primary use of the property has been altered. It
is clear that Canadian courts are not willing to protect broad, undefined
use rights, and based on the expropriation jurisprudence, the use rights
they are willing to protect are quite narrow. The law surrounding adverse
possession varies from province to province, and seems to offer more
protection to use rights. Yet there is the potential for the courts to only
look to the owner’s current use, and not to any future uses. The idea
of exclusion is often tacit in discussions of regulatory takings, and the
court has not yet fleshed it out. In CPR, the fact that the railway could
still exclude others from the Corridor was proof that the City had not
removed CP Rail’s right to use the Arbutus Corridor as a railway;113
Vancouver had not yet turned the Corridor into a legal park. Exclusion
arguably plays a much greater role in adverse possession than regulatory
takings, but that is likely due to the historical requirements that a person
be in possession of the property in order to prove such a claim. The
jurisprudence’s emphasis on the rights to exclude and the primary use
has remained relatively stable for several decades and contains lessons for
property theory.

109. Petersson, supra note 69 at 1307 [emphasis in original].
110. See Lubetsky, supra note 68 at 505–06.
111. This test will not apply in the case of mutual mistake. See Teis v Ancaster (Town)
(1997), 35 OR (3d) 216 at 218, 152 DLR (4th) 304 (CA). See also Lubetsky, supra note 68
at 515−25.
112. See Medicine Hat (City) v Mund, 86 AR 392 at para 14, 10 ACWS (3d) 47.
113. Supra note 6 at para 33.
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III. Property Lessons: From Jurisprudence to
Theory
Though the case law discussed in Part II is not a full assessment of
property law, it does focus on when property—particularly ownership—is
lost and/or transferred against the owner’s wishes. The case law therefore
offers insight into how the courts understand ownership. It is clear that
Canadian property jurisprudence does not necessarily protect ownership
to the same extent as envisaged by the theorists. Not surprisingly, the
relatively narrow protection afforded by Canadian de facto takings
law has come under some criticism for failing to adequately protect
property.114 Yet both the courts and the theorists agree that property
can, and perhaps should, be heavily regulated.115 In this Part I compare
the definition of ownership offered by Canadian courts with that offered
by the essentialist theorists. I do this by analyzing the two key rights
that Canadian courts rely upon in their discussion of ownership. I argue
that these rights complicate the theoretical picture presented by the
essentialist theorists. Put simply, the Canadian jurisprudence allows for
predictability and stability in ownership but also offers ways to protect
the interests of non-owners as well.
Where the essentialist theorists and Canadian jurisprudence overlap
the most is in the recognition of the centrality of the right to exclude and
the right to use. These two rights are typically included, either explicitly
or implicitly, in the core “lump” or “module” of property that many
essentialist theorists endorse.116 However, any discussion of the right
to transfer or dispose of property—which is usually the third key right
in the new core understanding of ownership117—is notably absent from
the Canadian property jurisprudence. This is likely due to the fact that
none of the cases have directly touched on the loss of the right to dispose,
but arguably the right to dispose is lost along with the right to use. You
cannot transfer your property if all reasonable uses have been removed
114. See e.g. Brown, “Legal Incoherence”, supra note 77; Brown, “Once More”, supra
note 78.
115. See Mariner Real Estate, supra note 93 at 306; Merrill, “Property Strategy”, supra note
7 at 2068–69.
116. See supra notes 44–51 and accompanying text.
117. Ibid. See also Dorfman, supra note 2 at 33–34.
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from it. As such, this complicates Dorfman’s argument that the loss of the
right to transfer represents the loss of ownership.118 His argument rests on
the idea that ownership is authority exercised over others, but does not
explain how the law can identify when that authority is lost. Canadian
property jurisprudence suggests that an owner’s authority is lost with the
loss of the right to use and the right to exclude.
Most mainstream property theory tacitly assumes that owners should
get a wide degree of discretion over how their property is used. Where
the Canadian jurisprudence diverges sharply from theory is its tendency
to only protect existing uses of property. Although the United States’
takings doctrine extends some protection to potential future uses, existing
uses are subject to a higher level of protection,119 which suggests that
there is something fundamental about them. The protection of current
uses seems to fit well with Douglas and McFarlane’s argument that use
rights are liberties rather than “claim-rights” and are thus less protected.120
However, Douglas and McFarlane’s thesis does not explain why courts
protect existing uses more than future uses. Deference to existing uses
may be no more than judicial deference to the status quo, or it may be
a reflection of the courts’ preference to focus on the provable facts of
a case rather than on some speculative future. Arguably, courts do not
have the insight to intervene in decisions about how property should be
used; such future-oriented decisions are best left to legislatures. Where the
courts will intervene, however, is when the primary use of the property is
removed or rendered impossible.121 In so doing, the courts are protecting
the settled expectations of parties. The judicial protection of current uses,
then, offers ownership a degree of stability and suggests that such uses are
a baseline of property which cannot be lost without losing the property
right.
Furthermore, Canadian courts’ reluctance or refusal to protect
potential future uses says something about ownership. In CPR, the
Court thought that setting the agenda for the future uses of the Arbutus
118. Dorfman, supra note 2 at 34.
119. See Christopher Serkin, “Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations”
(2009) 84:5 NYUL Rev 1222 at 1291.
120. Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 48 at 232–40.
121. This is also seen in the jurisprudence on nuisance, though a full examination of how
it plays out in nuisance cases is beyond the scope of this article.
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Corridor was not a property right.122 This hints at a more democratic
vision of property than previously recognized. By upholding the bylaw,
the Court respected the legitimate decision-making power of Vancouver.
Property theorists have long tied themselves in knots in their attempts
to explain how private property is compatible with democracy: How is
it that one person can legitimately control a resource that other people
might need?123 The answer offered by Canadian property jurisprudence
is that owners do not have the only say in how property is used. Private
property necessarily affects other people, including those with adjacent
property rights and those without property rights, and owner’s rights can
be, should be, and are limited by these rights. These limits are to some
extent reciprocal in that every owner’s rights are limited by the rights of
adjacent owners and non-owners. In short, property rights overlap and
interconnect in ways that require the kind of oversight of uses that is
impossible for each owner to manage by himself. Ownership thus exists
in a network consisting of other owners and society more broadly.
In his discussion of an architectural or modular theory of property,
Smith noted that “property rights ‘mesh’ with neighboring property
rights and show network effects with more far-flung property rights”.124
His point is that standardizing property rights make them more valuable
to everyone who has them. Yet he does not explicitly discuss the ways
in which uses affect each other, and how a sort of reliance interest can
develop on certain uses being precluded. To go back to the facts of CPR,
the existence of a de facto park likely increased the value of the properties
in the adjacent residential areas. Had the Corridor been developed in
the way that CP Rail wished, the value of adjacent properties may have
decreased. Property values would likely also decrease if CP Rail returned
to using the Corridor as a railway, but the City seemed to gamble on the
belief that the line was economically unviable.125 The Court’s reliance on
122. Supra note 6 at para 33.
123. See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1988) at 5, 105, 284, 424; Jeremy Waldron, “‘To Bestow Stability upon Possession’:
Hume’s Alternative to Locke” in Penner & Smith, supra note 48, 1 at 5; CB Macpherson,
“The Meaning of Property” in Macpherson, supra note 14, 1 at 11−13.
124. Smith, “Law of Things”, supra note 16 at 1707.
125. In 2014, CP Rail suggested that it might start using the Corridor as a railway again
in part because of its ongoing dispute with Vancouver. See “Will CP Trains Return to
Vancouver’s Arbutus Corridor?”, CBC News (9 May 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca>.
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CP Rail’s historical use of the property offered a way to protect the status
quo in Vancouver—one that had received democratic approval via the
bylaw. The standardizing of property rights cannot just be about value
or making property more efficient, as these are ideals of economics and
not the law.126 In a legal context, such standardization promotes stability
and predictability, and thus allows individuals to plan their lives around
this knowledge; it creates space for individuals to act as autonomous
agents.
The social impact of property is often implicit in both the jurisprudence
and the theory. In fact, the essentialist theorists have come under some
criticism for their failure to fully engage with questions of democratic
or social value, and for their failure to highlight the duties as well as
the rights of property.127 In response, Smith argues that such values are
emergent from property and we should not expect all aspects of property
law to promote them equally.128 The question is, then, whether or not
these values are actually emergent in the jurisprudence.
Jim Phillips and Phil Girard have argued that, at least in the courts,
protection of private property continues to trump other values, such as
labour rights.129 While that claim may have some truth to it, the case
that prompted that statement suggests that the Court would have upheld
labour rights had they been protected by statute.130 There is no doubt that
private property rights remain important in Canada, even if they are not
constitutionally protected. Nonetheless, the jurisprudence makes it clear
that property rights can only trump legislation in rare circumstances,
such as when legislation renders property unusable without explicitly
126. See Jeremy Waldron, “Property Law” in Dennis Patterson, ed, A Companion to
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (West Sussex, UK: Blackwell, 2010) 9 at 21.
127. See Joseph William Singer, “Property as the Law of Democracy” (2014) 63:6 Duke
LJ 1287 at 1291.
128. Smith, “Law of Things”, supra note 16 at 1719.
129. Jim Phillips & Phil Girard, “A Certain ‘Mallaise’: Harrison v Carswell, Shopping
Centre Picketing, and the Limits of the Postwar Settlement” in Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker,
eds, Work on Trial: Canadian Labour Law Struggles (Toronto: Irwin Law for the Osgoode
Society for Canadian Legal History, 2010) 249 at 272−73. On this point, see also Phillips
& Martin, supra note 87 (the background to Manitoba Fisheries makes it clear that the
fish processors were expropriated to protect Aboriginal fishers, yet the Supreme Court of
Canada found a way to protect the processors’ property rights).
130. Harrison v Carswell (1975), [1976] 2 SCR 200 at 219, 62 DLR (3d) 68.
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precluding compensation. In this way, the jurisprudence defers to
democratic processes while also upholding the settled expectations of
property rights.
A close reading of the jurisprudence suggests that Canadian courts
have certain tacit ideas about property. For one, the deference to primary
uses suggests that property rights overlap with each other and form an
interlocking network, or at least suggests that how property is used is of
interest to more than the owner. As such, there is reciprocity between
owners and non-owners in that the law recognizes that non-owners can
limit, but must respect, the rights of owners. Similarly, although the idea
of the physical exclusion of others remains important to Canadian courts’
understanding of ownership, such exclusion does not readily translate
into an exclusive right to decide the appropriate uses of the property. In
these ways, Canadian property jurisprudence seems to respect democratic
values by limiting the ability of owners to impose their will on others
while limiting the ability of non-owners, including the state, to interfere
with the settled uses of others’ property.

Conclusion
The idea of property in the cases discussed in this article offers an
alternative definition of ownership to those offered by property theorists.
Canadian courts define ownership as the right to the primary use of the
property and the right to exclude others from the property. The courts’
description of ownership differs from that seen throughout essentialist
property theory; the jurisprudence offers a narrower definition of
property, though it is one capable of tacitly recognizing the interests of
non-owners in owned things.
I have argued that the courts’ reluctance to uphold speculative future
uses as property rights and their refusal to recognize agenda setting as a
property right suggests deference to democratic processes. In leaving room
for the opinion of non-owners in how items of property, particularly
property in land, are to be used in the future, the Canadian jurisprudence
points to one answer to the age-old question of how to justify one
person’s control over resources. The answer is to limit the extent of the
owner’s control, and to limit an owner’s right to use to the historical or

702

(2015) 40:2 Queen’s LJ

primary use of the property. So long as the owner can continue to use
their property as they always have, they cannot be considered to have
suffered a legally recognizable loss.
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